Abstract: Ethics in the 21st century is threatened by a split between practical philosophy as a full-blown academic discipline and applied ethics as pragmatic problem-solving inside the political process. The place of the professional philosopher sitting on medical and other`ethics committees' as an`ethical expert' is somewhere in between. But where exactly? How is his role dened? Is the expertise he brings to bear on practical decisions of a purely technical or of a substantially moral kind? These issues are discussed both`from the outside' and`from the inside'. First, some of the theoretical controversies surrounding`ethical expertise' are discussed on the background of a rapidly growing literature in the eld. These are then related to the realities of commission work as they confront the academic ethicist in practice.
The Increasing Contribution of Ethics Experts to Advisory Bodies
Academic philosophers in Germany are hesitatingly leaving the ivory tower and assuming public roles. Moral philosophers increasingly sit on ethical boards and committees whose concern is to control and supervise human research and animal experimentation and to issue recommendations on questions of principle in morally sensitive and controversial areas such as medical research, environmental protection, sustainability and the protection of animals.
Though the number of these philosophers is still small, with the consequence that they often meet in commissions on highly diverse issues, they usually have a certain impact on the way these commissions work and on their results. These range from advisory statements like those of the German Ethikrat or the Zentrale Ethikkommission of the German Federal Chamber of Physicians The trend to an increased presence of philosophers in commissions and committees dealing with normative questions of public interest is understandable in view of several coinciding developments. First, bodies of the relevant kind underwent a rapid process of growth starting in the 1980s. Dogmatic judgements (on whatever basis, professional, value ethical, religious) were more and more replaced by discursive and procedural approaches to ethics consultation and ethical decision. In the clinic, for example, decisions on`hard cases' were no longer monopolized by leading physicians but were successively handed on to ethics committees and ethics consultants. In the public sphere, the authority to pass judgement and to resolve conicts without recourse to courts of law was more and more passed on by the legislature to advisory bodies and commissions, one of the earliest being the British Warnock Commission (cf. Warnock 1985) whose recommendations on how to regulate embryo research and reproductive medicine were accepted without modication by both Houses of Parliament.
Second, the positions traditionally held by theologians were successively taken by secular moral philosophers, a reection of the fact that church doctrine has become less and less representative of society as a whole. A growing need was felt for an ethical orientation that takes fully in account the ethical pluralism of society without sacricing its fundamental values. Third, philosophers with the corresponding aptitude and dedication made themselves known only recently. In signicant contrast to the tradition of moral theology, practical issues were only rarely part of the curriculum in ethics as taught in the universities.`Applied ethics' and`bioethics' were only recently accepted as academic subjects of their own. Still, the number of specialists in these elds is rather small, presumably because of the rather bad prospects concentration on the eld holds for the applications for academic posts.
A Fundamental Puzzle
There is a fundamental puzzle in what is expected of moral philosophers in the diverse bodies of which they form part. There is by now not only a steadily growing literature on the question of ethical expertise (cf. Singer 1972; 1988; Caplan 1992; Weinstein 1994; Yoder 1998; Kaminsky 2006; Varelius 2008; Agich 2009; Gesang 2010) but also a remarkable convergence of opinion about how far to assign moral philosophers an expert status. First, there is full consent on the fact that moral philosophers in general possess certain distinguishing capacities. They are expected to know a good deal about ethical theories, systems of moral norms and professional moral codes.
They are expected not only to be able to lecture on basic ethical concepts and principles, but also to apply them to recurring situations in which these principles conict, and even to concrete cases. They are expected to have developed a feel for knowing which moral problems arise for which moral opinions in certain decision making situations, and which principles and viewpoints are likely to be brought to bear by those making the decision. They are expected to be able to understand and empathise with the viewpoint of others, distancing themselves more or less from their own personal values. After all, the distinguishing mark and one of the strengths of the moral philosopher is not the strength of his moral commitment but his ability to distance himself from this commitment. These qualications, however relevant they are, do not turn an ethics expert into a moral expert. A moral expert would be one who knows which norms and values are the correct ones, in a sense of`correct' by which correctness is understood as something more ambitious than simple conformity with widely accepted standards. In spite of the astonishing rise of moral realism and other kinds of objectivist metaethics in the last twenty years, it must be doubted whether moral convictions can be as securely armed as convictions of a factual nature. In general, moral convictions cannot be conclusively proved but depend upon plausibility considerations accepted by most but rarely by all participants in the debate. Though it might be argued that moral judgements inherently claim universal validity even in cases in which they do so only implicitly, there is no guarantee that the universal validity claimed corresponds to a factual universal consensus. This is nowhere more evident than in the context of questions that seem to defy even the most sustained eorts at ethical compromise, such as the question of the moral status of human embryos and the moral status of subhuman animals. It is highly doubtful whether there will ever be, even after long and concentrated discussion, something like a Peircean`xation of belief ' on questions of practical morality depending on fairly fundamental controversial issues such as those involved in abortion and vegetarianism. It must be conceded, however, that only a small fraction of moral problems under debate in commission work are of this ultimately irresolvable nature. In the majority of cases the issues handled are amenable to a reasoned consensus formation on a less fundamental level and on the basis of shared values and principles. What is controversial in these cases, is less which values or principles are taken as valid but how the values and principles taken as valid are to be interpreted in view of the particular situation at hand.
The fact that an ethics expert does not ipso facto count as a moral expert does not, however, imply that the ethics expert must therefore refrain from taking a stance on fundamental moral issues or leave moral judgement to others.
Nor does it imply that his judgements are in no way privileged in relation to the moral judgements of ethical laymen. It is important, however, to acknowledge that his judgement is no longer fully covered by his expert status. As a moralist he makes judgements on the same basis as non-philosophers, that is, based on his own personal moral judgement. The only privilege he can claim for himself is that the way in which he reaches his moral conclusion is signicantly dierent from the way ethical laypeople reach their moral conclusions: It is more considered, better thought out, more aware of inconsistencies and incoherences, and perhaps less partial and opportunistic. If there is a dierence qualifying him to be heard before deciding on ethically sensitive issues it is the modality rather than the substance of his judgement.
These dierences, though at rst sight more insubstantial than it is commonly thought, are nevertheless important. They may even be held to be necessary conditions for dealing with normative questions in a rational way.
First, the ethics expert will usually prot both from his expertise and his professional experience by basing his judgements on arguments. He can be expected not to lay himself open to attack through basing his arguments on simple authority or tradition. Even if the positions he takes toward a controversial issue are ultimately not amenable to anything like proof or verication, his willingness to base them as far as possible on arguments will open the way to a rational discussion based on the forceless force of the better argument (Habermas) instead of the force of persuasion and manipulation. This is highly relevant to moral discussion because experience shows that even intelligent and well-informed persons often have great diculties to observe standards of rationality in moral arguments (cf. Singer 1988, 161) . The sometimes glaring lack of rationality in moral judgement seems to be the price to be paid for their function of providing emotional stability and dening a more or less xed personal identity. The role of a defensor rationalitatis is, however, not the exclusive possession of the Second, the arguments of the moral philosopher can be expected to be much more explicit and elaborated than those of the layman. He can be expected to have a more dierentiated and nuanced view of complex cases than the philosophically unenlightened everyday observer. That means that if ethical expertise is less seen as some kind of superior knowledge but as some kind of superior skill, a good case can indeed be made for the possibility of ethical expertise. As the
American medical ethicists Yoder remarks:
The key is to see that expertise in ethics is connected with justication a claim to ethics expertise is not based on the truth of one's judgements but on one's ability to provide a coherent justication for them. (Yoder 1998, 13) Only that this does not exclude that two ethicists may have ethical expertise to the same degree and nevertheless dier in the decisions and strategies they single out and recommend as morally optimal. Ethical expertise must not be mistaken for moral expertise. Ethical expertise concerns the correctness of which judgements follow from what premises but not the correctness of these judgements absolutely. The expertise of the ethical expert is, in a way, hypothetical. As far as the moral philosopher is an expert, he is at best a semi-expert (Gesang 2010, 158).
Over and above this kind of`hypothetical' expertise, is it possible for the ethics expert to lay claim to further cognitive privileges? Occasionally the theory is heard that the moral philosopher's morality is superior to that of the practitioner, at least as far as the ability to reect and to dierentiate goes. In one of the earliest articles on moral expertise, Peter Singer claimed:
Someone familiar with moral concepts and with moral argument, who has ample time to gather information and think about it, may reasonably be expected to reach a soundly based conclusion more often than someone who is unfamiliar with moral concepts and moral arguments and has little time. So moral expertise would seem to be possible. (Singer 1972, 116f.) True, the moral philosopher is to a greater degree relieved from the practitioner's daily decision making routine, he has leisure in which to ponder on questions of a more abstract sort, he is free from organisational blindness and institutional constraints and more independent from the expectations of his profession and society. The independence of the moral philosopher is, however, easily overestimated. Whilst it can often be dicult for the practitioner to distance himself from a habitual and accepted routine, it can also be just as dicult for the moral philosopher to free himself from his favourite principles. In addition, the practitioner often has the advantage of simply being closer to the actual situation. At least, in many cases, he is better equipped to understand the position of those aected by the decisions made and to judge their psychological impact. If there are grounds to privilege the judgement of the moral philosopher these count only pro tanto. They can be overridden by other aspects.
This does not mean, however, that the practitioner is as such better equipped to function as a moral expert. It is true, in many cases the practitioner will have the more intimate knowledge of the practical problems that have to solved by, among others, moral deliberations. Moreover, he may be in a better position than the theoretician to empathize with those involved in morally unclear or morally complex situations, perhaps because he has undergone a special kind of training, or simply has much more experience with situations of the kind to be judged. Examples that come to mind are hospice work or medical care for the homeless, i.e. domains in which highly unusual background conditions have to taken into account and in which caretakers have to acquire highly specialized competences to do justice to those they care for. But, again, I do not believe that these facts change anything substantial in my scepticism about the possibility of moral expertise, taken as a superior avenue to moral knowledge. Intimate familiarity, sensibility and empathy can go together with a great number of dierent value orientations and norms. A consultant in a state-run counselling institution can be knowledgeable, sensitive and empathetic to the same degree as a consultant in a corresponding catholic institution and nevertheless give quite dierent, and even opposite, advice in questions such as family planning, abortion, or heterological insemination.
The Ethics Expert in Practice
To judge from experience, everything points to the fact that it makes very good sense for the ethics expert to become involved in advisory work. This is due to the fact that in most situations in which the philosopher's advice is required there is an essential lack of clarity about the ethical concepts and principles that can or should be brought to bear on it. This is regularly the case in biomedical ethics with such terms as human dignity, autonomy, distributive justice and quality of life. Wherever such ambiguous and controversial conceptions bear the brunt of an argument, the analytical competence of the moral philosopher is crucial.
Even those terms which seem straightforward, such as benet and harm, present far-reaching interpretation problems which keep a moral philosopher busy. Must a benet or harm always be experienced as such by a beneciary or a victim?
Can someone be harmed after his death? Can someone be harmed by the simple act of letting him live (as in the question of`wrongful life')?
Quite a number of philosophical ethical advisors make an attempt to solve practical problems in a pragmatic spirit, leaving aside the age-old debates about foundations and starting not from controversial basic principles but from axiomata media on a medium level of generality for which consensus is easier to achieve. There are roughly three models of such a`pragmatic' approach implicitly followed: principlism, moral minimalism, and a`moral common sense' approach invoking conventional morality in a quasi Aristotelian way. The problem with all three approaches is that they have serious limitations. By ignoring dierences in fundamental principles (e.g. between Kantianism and utilitarianism) and trying to establish a consensus on a non-fundamental level they cannot really account for the deep dissension that pervades large areas of applied ethics.
Principlism refers to the approach made popular by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress but in many ways anticipated in Schopenhauer's reconstructive ethics (cf. Birnbacher 1990). Beauchamp and Childress propose to debate and to reach a consensus on practical problems in medical ethics by reference to a quartet of moral commonplaces or topoi by which most moral dilemmas can be adequately described and analysed: non-malecence, autonomy, benecence and equality (Beauchamp/Childress 1994) . This approach is widely used by ethical advisors all over the world, especially by those with a medical rather than philosophical background. Moral minimalism is the theory that there is an indisputable minimum of moral norms ultimately based in elementary human interests. Its most well-known formulation is that of Bernard Gert (cf. Gert 1998) whose canon of ten`moral rules' imitates the old testament decalogue not only in language but partly also in substance:
1. Do not kill. 
Do your duty.
A similar minimalist approach was adopted by the German ethicist and legal philosopher Norbert Hoerster in his defences of a liberal position towards e.g. abortion and euthanasia (cf. Hoerster 1995; .
Both approaches have considerable merits but also serious limitations. The rst limitation is that they leave most practical problemsand nearly all of those arising in committee workunderdetermined. In both theories, the rules are treated as prima facie rules which leave room for exceptions, and both theories are rather non-committal in regard to the relative weights to be assigned to these rules in cases of conict. In contrast, the complex and controversial issues discussed in ethical boards usually involve more than one of these rules so that a decision has to be made as to relative priorities. Furthermore, the rules of both theories are open to dierent interpretations with widely diverging consequences for concrete medical practice (cf. Birnbacher 1994). In practice, the interpretation implicitly or explicitly chosen will be inuenced both by the moral intuitions about the individual case and by the basic principles held by the person in question. A utilitarian reluctant to recognise any direct obligation to preserve non-sentient human life is likely to give the principle of nonmalecence an interpretation quite dierent from that given by an adherent of traditional Christian ethics with its emphasis on preserving human life even in its nonsentient and germinal forms. In other contexts, the Utilitarian is likely to be more sympathetic than the traditional Christian moralist to the idea of talking of`harming' even in cases in which something is not done that would have changed the course of nature for the better.
The second limitation of both variants of a pragmatic ethics is that they are too`minimalist' to capture the substance of each individual moral belief system.
By restricting themselves to the greatest common denominator of ethical beliefs It must be doubted whether the appeal to a moral`common sense' favoured by the third, neo-Aristotelian, approach is of very great help in this dilemma.
The existence of a`common sense' relevant to the questions at issue is improbable to the same degree that these issues are controversial enough to come up for discussion in ethical boards. Furthermore, the`consensus' or`agreement' What follows from the limitations of the most common forms of a`pragmatic' approach to moral questions for the ethics expert? One obvious consequence is that the`received views' on which the pragmatic approaches rely in one way or the other cannot serve as criterial principles by which controversial issues can be settled. This does not imply, however, that they are simply redundant and can be left to themselves. Their function is pragmatic rather than adjudicatory.
By establishing an initial consensus on what aspects are in principle relevant to a given topic, but without assigning weights to these aspects or prejudging questions of priority, they can play an important integrative role, a role that is especially important in cases of seemingly irresolvable conict. By committing all concerned parties to an agreed reference frame that does not decide the issue but must be lled out by detailed discussion, reference to agreed opinion and common morality' furthers a climate of mutual respect, tolerance and fair-play and serves as a door-opener to a disciplined and constructive discussion.
It would be wrong to think, however, that the ethical expertise of the ethics expert, or his moral views, stand in the fore of his everyday activities. Most of the time the ethics expert is engaged as a`generalist', identifying latent moral problem areas, working on the recognition of insuciently represented interests and standpoints, and, in situations of conict, mediating between opposing points of view. The very fact that on each advisory and decision making committee representatives of a certain leading discipline dominate the discussion (doctors on medical boards, natural scientists on boards for the protection of animals, social scientists and engineers in bodies dealing with technical risks) creates the risk of a distorted or at least biased view of what is at stake in a given issue.
Natural scientists rarely have a feeling for the social awareness and acceptance of what they do and for the symbolic value of controversial scientic, technical and medical innovations. Social scientists, on the other hand, tend to take these values as givens without making the eort to test them against criteria of rationality and adequacy. In view of this the ethics expert often feels it to be his task to make a`moral diagnosis' with the objectiveness of an outsider who looks beyond the scope of each subject and brings those aspects of the problem into discussion which tend to be neglected by insiders.
If the fronts of two conicting sides harden, the ethics expert is landed with an important mediatory task: to make the views and perspectives of one side understandable to the other. He feels called upon to put right prejudices, mistaken beliefs and myths, and to clear the way for a disciplined, discriminating and rational exchange of arguments. Despite his neutrality, however, it is possible that polarisation, defamation and dreadful simplications, such as those that spread throughout German bioethical discussion in the 1990s may force the ethics expert to leave his neutral mediatory stance and to side with one of the parties.
The Ethics ExpertTarget of Mixed Feelings
The ethicist engaged in advisory work is a target of ambivalence no less than other people engaged in political activities in the widest sense: Admiration and esteem are intermingled with aversion and suspicion. On the one hand, the trulỳ practical' practical philosopher is highly praised, among his peers as well as by the general public, for his stepping out of the ivory tower and for his courage to take risks his purely academic colleagues do not have to face. His decision to take active responsibility for the course of things in the real word is not only received with respect but often also with a good deal of genuine admiration. At the same time, it cannot be denied that even within his own profession the ethics expert does not have the best of reputations. By the very fact that he engages himself with problems of application, he betrays`philosophical purity' in the eyes of many of his more academic colleagues. He is also a subject of suspicion because, by being mixed up in the dubious game of political discourse, he is thought of as someone who argues strategically rather than honestly and therefore undermines the intellectual integrity of the profession as a whole. Since, according to leading philosophical thought, normative statements are not capable of being literally true, a latent charge of frivolity and of the philosopher having sold his soul to everyday politics overshadows the whole school of applied ethics. As long as applied ethics is not based on truths, that is, on a denitively valid theory, it should better be left to preachers, gurus and politicians. It is no accident, therefore, that the typical question specialist philosophers ask an applied moral philosopher is`Do you do any real philosophy apart from this?'
The reservations and accusations coming from the public sphere and the media lead in a dierent direction. On the one hand the moral philosopher is accused of being the dogsbody to certain powerful factions, opinions and interests (and consciously or unconsciously making himself a slave of governmental, political and economic powers). On the other hand there is the charge that he presents a risk to others and consciously or unconsciously undermines important social value orientations. As far as structures are concerned the ethics expert is too conservative, whilst when it comes to values he is not conservative enough.
Both of these charges are marked by an unusual rigour which often goes as far as being slanderous, together with conspiracy theories quite out of touch with reality. According to these theories the practical philosopher's undermining of important value orientations is seen less as the result of individual error, but far more often as the result of a planned subversion, either by the government or by interest groups.
Rationally considered, the practically committed moral philosopher can hardly avoid the charge of being a`dogsbody' or of collaborating in what is sometimes called`service ethics'. Because every moralist has, and indeed must have, an interest in the practical application of his moral ideas, he will naturally seek those who oer him the chance to realise his goals eectively. What looks from the outside like a one-sided exploitation of the moral philosopher by his powerful clients', is in fact usually the result of a deliberate co-operation from both sides.
In addition, it is virtually unavoidable that every practically committed moral philosopher incurs the accusation of`submissiveness' by those who oppose his opinions. Distinctively restrictive positions in many questions of bioethics are suspected of complying with the wishes of the church (on the part of anti-church circles), whilst distinctively liberal positions are suspected of oering their services to economical interest groups (on the part of the left). The background to this is an insucient preparedness to acknowledge the pluralism of moral plausibilities: If someone thinks dierently from ourselves, we easily assume that he either has strategic reasons for doing so, or has been led astray. Thus, the moral philosopher who takes a middle stand between the extremists must be prepared for accusations of`submissiveness' from both sides. He who takes a middle stand in the animal rights debate, for example, will nd few supporters, not only from those who are strictly opposed to animal experimentation but also from those representing research interests.
The charge of being a risk to others and of being subversive are as hard to avoid. First because, as Schopenhauer rightly noted, the moral philosopher's striving after intellectual honesty can easily be seen as a sacrilegious attack on sacred aairs of the heart (Foundation of Morals, 1). He who judges using reason instead of conscience, is a shifty fellow from the very start. Secondly because, where issues of an explosive nature are concerned, the moral philosopher (as long as he does not swim with the spirit of the times or ee with empty phrases) cannot avoid giving oence to one faction or another through his moral position. Dierently from scientic contexts, these factions will not only charge him of intellectual, but also of moral oence. The moral philosopher who makes mistakes in moral issues is not only a bad thinker, but also a bad person and worthy of moral contempt. At the very least he is a potential danger to others in that his competence and authority as a moral philosopher (or as a moralist, preacher or rhetorician) can be used either by himself or by others to proselytise.
In contrast to the charge of exploitation, the charge of being a risk to others must be taken seriously. Not only in the way that dangerously held beliefs can endanger the moral philosopher himself (as in the case of Socrates) but also in the way that the moral philosopher must objectively estimate and consider the risks of presenting his moral beliefs in public. The moralising philosopher is accountable for the unintended but predictable consequences of his publicly held moral standpoint, in the sense of what was coined Ethikfolgenethik by Odo Marquard, the ethics regarding the consequences of ethics. He cannot shake o the responsibility for these consequences by simply ascribing them to the plausibility of their contents. Whether a certain view is correct is one thing;
whether it is correct to make it public is another. The practising ethicist in his role of a public gure is no more exempted from moral norms than the representative of other professions, and especially moralists of a more or less consequentialist observance risk inconsistency by discounting the consequences of their own practice in the role of ethical experts.
The ethics expert is, however, rarely troubled by the charge of being a risk to others. This is because this risk is often bound to value positions the holder of`dangerous' positions does not share. In this way those who should be primarily aected by so-called`Slippery Slope Arguments' are generally the least impressed. He who is for the ocial lifting of the control on drugs or for free abortion, cannot be aected by the Slippery Slope risks of methadone treatment or a law allowing the termination of a pregnancy within the rst three months.
The argument of the Slippery Slope will only make an impression on the moral philosopher as far as his own values are endangereda situation that is often not recognized as such by those who consider their own values so irrefutable that they cannot imagine the possibility of there being alternative values, let alone empathise with them. Furthermore, what the moral philosopher tends to consider openness and composure is easily disparaged as coldness and inhumanity depending on the focus of moral sympathy. To come back to the example of animal experimentation: If the focus is laid primarily on the sick who can be helped by the progress made possible by animal experiments, the charge of inhumanity will undoubtedly be brought against the moral philosopher pleading for restrictions of animal experiments for ethical reasons. This same charge, however, will also be brought against him by animal rights supporters for his very readiness to justify animal experiments even under very restrictive conditions. In short, the moral philosopher leaving the ivory tower does not only need good reasons and sound theories, but also, and above all, good nerves.
